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For several years now we have seen the heightening of old battles between 'Science' 
and 'Culture', with Darwin reinstated as the figurehead of Science. Today, it is no 
longer physics, with its military utility, but molecular biology, with its commercial 
stakes, which has become the new King of Science. Not atomic energy, but 
recombinant DNA, is the object of the latest form of veneration - now the final 
arbiter of human circumstance and potential. The loss of belief in the legacies of 
both Marx and Keynes as guides for social change, and the intensified attacks on 
the followers of Freud as diviners of self-knowledge, have something to do with the 
current return to Darwin. So too does another feature of our times:  the continuing 
shifts and disruptions in gender relations, gender practices and identities, alongside 
persistant feminist questionings, have encouraged an enthusiastic reception for new 
theories endorsing genetic origins for normative investments in sexual difference.  
 'Feminists, meet Mr. Darwin!', science columnist Robert Wright announces 
from the USA (Wright, 1994, p.34). Feminist theorists had  for decades been 
questioning the inevitability of the old gender order, emphasising its specifically 
social origins. More recently, they have incorporated post-stucturalist analysis and 
deconstruction to describe what they see as the merely coercively reiterated, and 
thereby discursively constructed, constraints of gender (Butler, 1990; Gergen and 
Davis, 1997). A provocative flaunting and celebration of the instabilities and 
fluidities of gender identities was designed to mock biological presumptions, 
highlighting their cultural, or semiotic formation - apparently all ready for 
subversion and change! Moreover, from media apprehension over the boys thought 
to be 'losing out' when compared with girls in school to the emergence of women 
bosses or the visibility of transexual identities, gender anxieties and disruptions are 
a constant focus of debate. In this context, it is hard not to suspect that some part of 
the current return to Darwin, genes and genetics is a reactive response to the well-
documented anxieties generated by uncertainties around gender issues (Samuels, 
1993, p.222; Dunant and Porter, 1996, p.2). Certainly, those who think they have 
the found the fundamental constraints on gender and sexuality seem to offer some 
consolation for such anxieties. For here we can learn that sexual polarity is encoded 
in our 'selfish' genes; has been there for millennia; is always likely to be with us, at 
least to some extent. Within the discipline of psychology, the growing appeal of 
evolutionary explanations of human behaviour has been used to undermine the 
efforts of those, like the other authors in this collection, who have been seeking a 
richer underdstanding of the place of culture in human conduct, and calling, in the 
words of Christine Griffin (above?), for psychologists to become 'cultural 
ethnographers'. 
 It may seem an odd time for the return of any form of fundamentalism,  
biological or otherwise, with universal truths now derided as fraudulent 'grand 
narratives' by the poststructuralist critics favoured in literary and cultural studies 
(Lyotard, 1984). But that, as we shall see, only heightens the battles. The stakes are 
high. The goal is not just conceptual containment of potentially unlimited shifts in 
gender beliefs and practices, though without doubt the media is most attentive to 
reports of their immunity to cultural flexibility (Martin, 1992). It is also a return to 
the allegedly more rigorous authority of the biological sciences to explain much that 
has recently been studied through a cross-disciplinary cultural lens. The hope is to 
defeat, once and for all, those cultural theorists who assume that 'ideas that draw 
upon the authority of nature nearly always have their origin in ideas about society'. 
(Ross, 1994, p.15)   
 From Richard Dawkins, the authorised popularizer of science in Britain 
(occupying the Chair for the Public Understanding of Science specifically created 
for him at Oxford University by Microsoft millionaire Charles Simonyi), we can 
learn 'the first axiom of science': 'Plants and animals alike all - in their immensely 
complicated, enmeshed ways - are doing the same fundamental thing, which is 
propagating genes' (cited in Hughes, 1998). The eternal truths of Darwin's grand 
narrative (reinterpreted anew) have returned with a vengeance to reshape 
intellectual agendas at the closing of this century, just as strongly as they did in the 
last. And yet, only a generation ago appeals to evolutionary biology to explain 
cultural practices or social hierarchy were fiercely denounced as justifications for 
conservative prejudices. These accounts still triggered the memory of the 
appropriation of Darwin's ideas earlier this century, when they had been used to 
justify all manner of eugenic-inspired campaigns exemplifying the most noxious 
class, 'race', and anti-immigrant prejudices (occurring well before Hitler's genocidal 
practices began to make them widely unacceptable (Kevles, 1985). But today, 
mirroring that earlier time, the most reductive forms of evolutionary theory are 
advanced by actively committed social reformers: manifest, for example, in Tony 
Blair's favourite think-tank, Demos, exploring the supposed implications of 
evolutionary psychology for the shaping of social policy in Britain, in Matters of 
Life and Death: The world view from evolutionary psychology  (Demos, 1996).   
 
Darwinian Predictions   
Darwin had argued that all living things are related, having descended from a 
common origin. Species have appeared and disappeared over time, through a 
mechanism of natural selection or 'Survival of the Fittest', ensuring that only those 
life forms best suited to survive and reproduce themselves in any specific habitat 
continue to exist (Darwin, 1968). Alongside the random mutations generating 
'natural selection' for survival, Darwin also wrote of 'sexual selection' for effective 
procreation in sexually reproducing species, producing 'a struggle between the 
males for possession of the females', alongside choice and selection of males by 
females (Darwin, 1968, p.136). Reflecting the creed of imperial England, Darwin 
saw sexual hierarchy conjoined with racial hierarchy, producing white males at the 
pinnacle of evolution. However, today's Darwinians generally distance themselves 
formally, although not always effectively, from the Victorian racist dynamics of 
'sexual selection', even as they militantly affirm its sexist dynamics: males have an 
inherent advantage in the evolutionary 'arms race' (Dawkins and Krebs,1979, 
p.489).  
  Patriarchal precedent and capitalist market values seemed embarrassingly 
prominent in the first blast of resurgent Darwinianism two decades ago, with the 
publication of E.O. Wilson's Sociobiology in 1975 and Richard Dawkin's The 
Selfish Gene the next year (Wilson, 1975; Dawkins 1976). In a decade of resurgent 
feminism, these books promised a genetic underpinning for male dominance and 
aggression, female passivity and domestication, in terms of 'the optimizing of 
reproductive fitness' - albeit without any knowledge of actual genetic determinants. 
Sexual selection for competitive reproductive advantage was the aspect of Darwin's 
work that emerged as the fundamental postulate of sociobiology. Sociobiology was 
an elaboration not so much of Darwin's own writing, as of its extension to accounts 
of differential 'parental investment' in offspring (in sperm, egg, and the raising of 
progeny to reproductive age), first proposed by the US biologist, Robert Trivers, in 
1974 (Trivers, 1974).  
 Trivers's conjecture is that promiscuous male behaviour evolved to promote 
the maximum spread of 'low-cost' copious sperm; prudent and passive female 
behaviour to accommodate the 'high-cost' requirements of the far fewer female 
eggs. Dawkins reiterates this argument, concluding: 'it is possible to interpret all 
other differences between the sexes as stemming from this one basic difference ... 
Female exploitation begins here' (Dawkins, 1976, p.153, emphasis added). The 
search for single overarching principles unifying all forms of knowledge drives this 
return to Darwin. All human behaviour, E.O.Wilson echoes, faithfully obeys this 
one biological principle (Wilson, 1978, p.552).  
 Inside the academy, such genetic reductionism was briefly held at bay by 
vigorous rebuttal from biological and social scientists (Sahlins, 1977; Montague, 
1980; Rose et. al., 1982; Hubbard, 1982). Given that at this time sociobiologists 
could not even pretend to have direct knowledge of their ontologically founding 
category - human genes, the designated units for natural selection - there could in 
principle be no convincing verification, or falsification. It would seem an awkward 
failing for theorists whose mantra was scientific rigour; whose goal was the defeat 
of loose or sentimental thought and language. The situation is little different today, 
genetic boosterism notwithstanding.   
 However, the capital investment pouring into 'biotechnology' since the 
1980s, bringing together new microelectronic technology and procedures for gene 
splicing, generated vast hopes of commodifying and patenting new procedures for 
the production of plant, animal and even human life. The 'genetic revolution' had 
arrived, and ushered in the multi-billion dollar Human Genome Project, attempting 
to map all the genes of human DNA - with massive government support, first in the 
USA, since accelerating elsewhere (Kevles, 1992). Old visions of a brave new 
world have re-awakened, with scientists in control of genetic selection. The spread 
of neo-Darwinian ideas continues to accelerate. Yet what we find today is a 
muddled mix of genetic determinisms. One minute they are used to set limits on the 
potential for possible change in human society and culture; the next minute to 
promise the removal all human 'deficiencies', in a future where nothing is 
impossible.  
 
The Rise of Evolutionary Psychology 
The ambivalent pull of new Darwinian thinking is nowhere stronger than in 
mainstream psychology, some of whose scholars have moved effortlessly from an 
earlier emphasis on 'learning' in the explanation for human 'social behaviour' to 
promoting the greater utility of modern Darwinism, or new evolutionary 
psychology, for the same purpose. In Britain John Archer, in the forefront of 
analysing the acquisition of sex differences primarily in terms of social learning 
theory in the heyday of environmentalism in the 1970s, has now switched his 
emphasis to argue that 'evolutionary theory accounts much better for the overall 
patterns of sex differences and for their origins' (Archer, 1996, p.914). Anne 
Campbell, formerly studying the cultural dynamics of working-class 'girl gangs', 
now highlights evolutionary arguments to explain the nature of female aggression 
(Campbell, 1999). 
 Evolutionary psychology has become the most conspicuous 'new' theoretical 
perspective within psychology during the last decade, its exponents certain it will 
finally consummate their dream of unifying psychology with hard science, within 
the conceptual framework of natural selection (Tooby and Cosmides, 1992, p.49; 
Buss, 1995). Nowadays, evolutionary psychologists rely less on animal studies than 
their sociobiological predecessors. Instead they are on the lookout for universals of 
human behaviour. On finding any hint of them, they immediately assume some 
genetic explanation: any putatively universal behaviour, it is argued, must be 
adaptive, and must have been 'selected' for. If the universality relates to gender, it 
has been selected in order to encourage 'the reproductive strategies appropriate for 
their own sex' (Archer, 1996, p.916). As we saw with sociobiology, it is just such 
presumed sex-differentiated reproductive strategies which take us back to the issues 
most strongly disputed by those who have recently been contesting men's 
institutionalized dominance over women: the inevitability of men's sexual 
promiscuity, harassment or violence; the inequality of women's domestic burdens 
and parenting responsibilities.  
 In a recent overview, four leading evolutionary psychologists summarize  
achievements to date. They list thirty empirical 'discoveries' about human behaviour 
generated by evolutionary theory, many of them explaining gender contrasts such as 
sexually dimorphic mating strategies, male risk-taking and patterns of male 
homicide (Buss et. al., 1998 p.544). Yet, one does not have to believe that evolution 
and genetics play no role in human affairs (indeed, it would be hard to make much 
sense of such a claim) to point out that the apparent universality of certain practices 
does not entail a genetic origin. For example, even if we choose to overlook the 
weight of historical, anthropological and sociological evidence for enormous 
variability in the areas of human sexual conduct evolutionary psychology assumes 
are universally dimorphic, it would still be the case that the claimed universality of 
behaviour patterns could as easily be seen as a cultural effect, than as an evolved 
adaptation operating as a cause, of men's relatively greater access to economic 
resources and social power and privilege.  
 David Buss is best known for his body of research on what he calls 'mating 
strategies' across 35 cultures, showing that men claim to be far more promiscuous 
than women, and readier to have sex with any female strangers, so long as they are 
young and attractive. Women, in contrast, are said universally to report desiring (or 
'mating' preferences for) ambitious, industrious men, with good financial resources 
(Buss, 1994). But this pattern is precisely what those who stress the cultural rather 
than the biological basis of contrasting sexual conduct would themselves predict, 
whether via individually based 'learning theory' or discursively mediated 'social 
construction' perspectives. In male-dominated societies boys learn to see 
heterosexual activity as a confirmation of masculinity and know that boasting about 
their desire to perform it is the single easiest way of proclaiming their 'virility'. Girls 
learn to value committed relationships over casual sex, or discover that they ought 
to suggest such desires if they are not to suffer the consequences of being labelled 
whatever is the local vernacular for 'slag'. 
  The shallowness of the biological explanation of men's sexual braggadocio 
and women's circumspection, which some might see as a type of gender 
differentiating cultural 'identity work' in male dominated societies, is revealed in 
other studies. As Dorothy Einon suggests from her research, in which heterosexual 
men reported having three or four times the number of sexual partners that women 
reported having, the figures just don't compute: a tiny minority of enormously 
sexually active 'young and attractive' women would have, despite all their 
protestations, to be obliging an army of dedicatedly randy men (Einon, 1998). In 
contrast to the findings of evolutionary psychologists, the one constant of historical 
and sexological research on changes in the pursuit of human sexual pleasure is, in 
fact, their negative correspondence with reproductive ends (Lauman et. al., 1994; 
Wellings et.al., 1994; Bagemihl, 1999).  
 Martin Daly and Margo Wilson's popular evolutionary theory of male 
violence and homicide is even less persuasive, relying on the notion of 'kin 
selection' in which our genes are selected for co-operative or helping behaviour 
towards those with shared genes. The theory claims to explain why husbands are far 
more likely to murder their wives (genetically unrelated) than their biological 
children, and why a child is much more likely to be murdered, or physically abused, 
by a step-parent than a child with two biological parents (Daly and Wilson, 1988). 
It would not explain why an overwhelmingly greater number of human parents 
willingly adopt children, and most typically display remarkable love and concern 
for them. It would not explain why midwives in both the USA and Britain have 
been reporting for several years now that violence against women often begins 
when that woman is pregnant with a man's baby. The latest figures reported in the 
UK estimate this to be true for one-third of women who are attacked (HMSO, 
1998). It is, of course, precisely when made pregnant by their live-in partners that 
'females' cannot be impregnated by rival males: the time when they most fully 
'obey' the so-called 'Darwinian' rules for 'kin-selection', carrying 50% of the 
aggressor's genes. 
 A total absence of 'scientific rigour' often accompanies the postulated 
'paradigm shift' to an evolutionary psychology designed to secure that rigour. The 
ability to imagine an evolutionary scenario for supposed universal behaviours does 
nothing at all to establish the explanation's validity. As Looren de Jong and Van 
Der Steen observe of the controversies generated by Cosmides and Tooby's work on 
supposed universal cognitive adaptations (like that for 'cheater detection'), talk of 
'natural selection' is merely an empty generalization unless it is can delineate 
something about the evolutionary history of a trait's development (Looren de Jong 
and Van Der Steen, 1998, p.196). To the chagrin of psychologists like Steven 
Pinker, this is also the view of the famous language theorist, Noam Chomsky, who 
despite stressing the innateness of 'the language faculty', rejects the adaptationist 
account of language development as a mere 'fairy tale' (Chomsky, 1996, p.15). 
Indeed, one might be tempted to dismiss evolutionary psychology's speculations 
altogether, were it not for the media fascination with them.  
 Against the grain of the trend to focus on gender rather than race,  
some evolutionary psychologists have even managed to restore a classically 
ethnocentric way of applying evolutionary theory. Leslie Zebrowitz, for instance, 
suggests it is adaptive for men to prefer 'lighter skinned women'. The evolutionary 
explanation on offer is that light skin is a sign of fertility: women's skin is said to 
darken during periods of infertility, such as pregnancy, ingestion of contraceptives, 
and throughout infertile phases of the menstrual cycle. The empirical evidence of 
skin preference cannot be attributed to Western standards of beauty, we are assured, 
as it is documented cross-culturally (Leslie Zebrowitz, 1997). Yet given the higher 
status accorded to lighter skinned people in most cultures over the last 400 years, 
after certain global episodes like slavery and colonialisms, old and new, it is not too 
taxing to offer a few abiding cultural explanations for empirical findings such as 
these. 
 'New' evolutionary theorists, claim that they now eschew rigid biological 
determinism with their suggestion that genetic and environmental forces always 
interact. Yet, as Tooby and Cosmides clarifying The Adapted Mind, when they 
outline what they call the 'psychological foundations of culture', this interactionism 
still means that 'content-specific evolved psychologies constitute the building 
blocks out of which cultures themselves are manufactured' (Tooby and Cosmides, 
1992, p.207). This account is presented as less biologically reductionist than 
previous sociobiological explanations, but it can be seen as exactly the opposite: 
culture never exists autonomously from genetic selection. As we shall see, what its 
chief critics argue from their actual, rather than speculative, biological and 
paleontological work, is that we would understand the relation between genes and 
culture much better if we assumed the reverse. For there is no unitary or general 
standard of fitness in biology. What fitness entails is context specific. 
 
The Case for Theoretical Pluralism 
Some biologists have watched in bewilderment psychologists resorting to notions of 
gene selection to explain human behaviour, while 'the technical literature of 
evolutionary genetics has emphasized more and more the random and historically 
contingent nature of genetic change over time' (Lewontin, 1998, p.60). Their 
conflict, they say, is not with Darwin, but with the misuse of Darwin, whom they 
hope to rescue from his new friends (Rose, 1997, p.176; Eldredge, 1995). As many 
molecular biologists have noted, genes (and the gradual, small changes which 
constitute mutation) are neither the only, and far from the necessary, driving forces 
of evolution. In Steven Rose's recent critique of those he calls the 'ultra-
Darwinians', 'the individual gene is not the only level at which selection occurs'; 
'natural selection is not the only force driving evolutionary change'; 'organisms are 
not indefinitely flexible to change'; 'organisms are not mere passive responders to 
selective forces but active players in their own destiny' (Rose, 1997, p.246). 
 No unifying principle drives either genetic or social change. On the one 
hand, simply tweaking a rat's whiskers causes changes in gene expression in the 
sensory cortex (See Plomin, 1994, p.14). On the other hand, quite staggering 
changes in the nature of the world have occurred with very few, if any, ties to 
genetic change. What we find in humanevolution is precisely the 
incommensurability between world history and natural evolution, not the reflection 
of the limitations of human biology, but rather the negation of such limitation 
(Gould, 1996, p.220). 
 The new enthusiasm for the idea that our gene histories determine our 
cultural futures thus occurs despite, not because of, new genetic knowledge. Human 
culture can always be passed on immediately to one's heirs (biological or otherwise) 
in speedy and direct Lamarkian fashion; while genetic evolution must move along 
the inordinately slower, indirect pathways of random mutation, natural selection 
and contingency. The central point, made repeatedly by the critics of those 
evolutionary psychologists who are busy reversing the reel to explain why we are 
the way we are, is that changes in genetic structure, which may survive as 
adaptations to particular environments, are precisely what Darwin saw them to be: 
'local adaptations'. The adaptations that may enable an organism to survive in one 
situation are not optimal in any general way, they will differ from those which 
promote survival in another. Genes which were not selected for may also survive 
(as 'exaptations' or 'spandrels') because they just happen to reside alongside genes 
which were optimal for adaptation, or simply as by-products or co-options of 
features which survived as contributing to reproductive fitness.  
 Illustrating the non-adaptationist account of human mental functioning, 
Gould, Lewontin, Robert Brandon and many other researchers have often 
commented that the complexity of the human brain and its extraordinary 
endowment, for example, was not selected for in order to enable humans to read 
and write - skills which emerged many centuries after the appearance of those 
bigger brains (Gould, 1996; Lewontin 1993; Brandon, 1990). Rather, these skills 
emerged as by-products of the potential of the already-evolved brains. Indeed, 
historical evidence supporting adaptive explanations is lacking for all higher mental 
processes, which is what makes their postulation by evolutionary psychologists so 
facile (Richardson, 1996). Against the fundamentalist or ultra-Darwinians, 
Darwinian pluralists like Gould, Lewontin or Rose, argue that what millions of 
years of genetic change has selected for in human species is not any single set of 
'natural' rules for development, 'sexual' or otherwise; rather, it has brought about the 
far more impressive open trend towards ever greater complexity, ever greater 
adaptability. 'If biology is indeed destiny', Rose concludes, 'then that destiny is 
constrained freedom' (Rose, 1997, p.245). Inside biology, there is a multiplicity of 
explanatory levels, although many within the field have constantly to battle against 
media promotion of the followers of genetic foundationalism in order to point this 
out. 
 
Gene Talk Versus Social Change 
Inside psychology, the same battle rages. Gene talk is becoming ubiquitous. Every 
area of human behaviour, no matter how clearly culturally diverse and complex - 
from good mothering to divorce and moral turpitude - is abruptly thrust back onto 
genetic foundations. Such is the force of the current hegemony of genetic anti-
culturalism that few people even bother to look at the lamentably inconclusive 
nature of the research which galvanises media attention whenever it can be used to 
proclaim some genetic origin of human behaviour (Fausto-Sterling, 1992; Hubbard 
and Wald, 1993). Yet, such claims only sound intelligible to those who have 
already closed their eyes to the complexities of the behaviour of living things, not to 
mention the mobilities of language and representation. 
 For even if we could trace complex human behaviour to a particular  
'gene' sequence, this correspondence would not tell us as much as we might hope. 
Genetic activity is not constant, but modified by the presence or absence of other 
genes in the genome, by the cellular environment, and by a multitude of external 
circumstances, from temperature or exposure to different metals to viral infection 
and the presence or absence of of other social and physical environmental features. 
Thus the same behavioural outcome can result from quite different gene sequences. 
If we could agree on how to identify behaviour phenotypically (itself profoundly 
contentious) if we had some idea how to connect it with a particular 'gene' 
sequence, the molecular underpinnings would still remain forbiddingly convoluted. 
This is why trying to understand even genetically 'simple' diseases, like 
haemophilia, proves hugely complicated, as Lewontin explains: 'hemophiliacs differ 
from people whose blood clots normally by one of 208 different DNA variations, 
all in the same gene' (Lewontin, 1993, p.69). Many scientists now point to the 
dangers arising from the increasing array of diagnostic DNA tests, and the 
inevitability of their misuse. Like the biologist Ruth Hubbard, they fear that 'gene 
hunters' are securing an ideological climate which diverts attention away from the 
analysis of environmental and social problems, in a deplorable repetition of the 
thinking and rhetoric of eugenicists in the early decades of this century (Hubbard 
and Wald, 1993). 
 It is here that the predilections of evolutionary psychologists for stressing 
the genetic Paleolithic constraints on possible change in human social relations 
(especially in patterns of sexual and gender interactions) give way to the reckless 
illusions of some molecular biologists (and their political and commercial 
sponsors), imagining utopian futures where individuals are held responsible for 
breeding flawless offspring, the desired 'perfect baby'. Such presumptions involve 
not only the denial of the intrinsic uncertainties and complexities in human genetic 
transactions. They also encourage the reduction of social problems to flimsy 
biological speculations, elevating dreams of genetic omnipotence and 
normalization. In an inversion of earlier beliefs, it is now 'nature', rather than 
'nurture', which is presumed infinitely malleable, at least potentially. This is despite 
the billions invested in human biotechnology over the last forty years, so far 
producing so little in useful treatments - with the notable exceptions of the synthesis 
of a bacterial protein for use in haemophilia, and the engendering of the secretion of 
hormones for human growth in sheep (Jones,1997, p.63). It is the British geneticist 
Steve Jones who has been among the most anxious to acknowledge that the idea of 
curing known inherited disease by replacing DNA is a 'piece of biological hubris': 
'How the DNA in a virtually formless egg is translated into an adult body remains 
almost a mystery' (Jones,1997, p.62). Undaunted, the move to aggrandize the notion 
of 'genetic disease', and its biological elimination, continues apace - encouraged by 
the Human Genome Project. This conceptual shift, including psychological states - 
such as homosexual desire, which may well be neither genetic, nor diseases - was 
soon extended to explain the social 'impairments' of homelessness and poverty, as 
in the writing and speeches of molecular biologist David Koshland, when editor of 
the influential Science magazine in the 1980s (Koshland,1989, p.189; see Yoxen, 
1984). 
 Two contradictory trends have intensified rather than resolved old clashes 
between culture and science, to the detriment of useful collaboration. On the one 
hand, the rise of cultural studies encouraged interdisciplinary efforts to blur the 
demarcations between distinct disciplinary sources of knowledge, strongly 
supported by most (but not all) feminist scholarship. This work emphasised the 
constitutive role of language and cultural context in different areas of scientific 
thought and practices. On the other hand, such understandings exacerbated a 
counter trend, sometimes taking the form of direct backlash against cultural studies 
and feminist critique, in which the very notion of 'culture' is vanishing from the 
favoured conceptual framework of the social and biological sciences, connected 
with the trend to replace 'social' with 'life' or 'human' sciences. As Evelyn Fox 
Keller notes, 'in terms that increasingly dominate contemporary discourse, "culture" 
has become subsumed under biology.' (Keller, 1992, p.297). Evolutionary 
psychologists have helped to promote this particular disappearing act. Declaring 
their interest in culture or the effects of nurture on individual development, they 
nevertheless assume that 'culture is part of our biology' because, as Henry Plotkin 
suggests, 'the traits that cause culture have been selected for' (Plotkin, 1997, p.111; 
231). More elaborately, Richard Dawkins, Daniel Dennett and Susan Blakemore, 
refer to cultural inheritance as 'memes'. As Dawkins outlines, in strict analogy with 
his founding category of the 'gene', a 'meme' is 'anything that replicates itself from 
brain to brain, via an available means of copying. . . . The genes build the hardware. 
The memes are the software.' (Dawkins, 1997, p302; 308). Responding in dismay to 
such reductionist axioms, Steve Jones protests: 'Just as geneticists begin to realize 
how far it is between DNA and organism, their subject is being hijacked. Society is, 
it seems, little more than the product of genes.' (Jones, 1998, p.63) The insistence 
on a genetic subtext, which draws attention away from the differing levels of the 
cultural domain - with its diverse institutional and social practices; its complex 
representations and interpretive strategies - is unmistakable.  
 
For Epistemic Diversity 
As I see it, the attempt to abridge culture into biology, or biology into culture, can 
only impoverish us all. There never can be any single, unified project with the 
capacity to encompass the different levels of explanation necessary for 
understanding the complexity of human affairs. Some who have turned to totalizing 
Darwinian or genetic visions have done so in criticism of recent cultural theorists' 
dismissal of the relevance of the body, and either its evolutionary history or its 
changing biological potential (McIntosh and Ehrenriech, 1997). They rightly reject 
the idea that exploring the meanings we attach to bodily states, and their 
accompanying performative enactments or psychic investments, encompasses all 
we can achieve in relation to corporeal reality. Such absolute cultural appropriation 
of the life spans of any living creature is about as foolish as imagining that they are 
merely machines for the replication of DNA. 
 One obvious illustration is the issue of human reproduction, so central for 
ultra-Darwinians, feminists and cultural theorists alike. The former see only 
sexually dimorphic adaptations for the most efficient gene dispersal. The latter, 
looking through the lens of culture, know that bodies are produced in particular 
discourses with strong normative and symbolic meanings. Women's bodies are 
always defined by their capacity for pregnancy, even though they are reproductively 
infertile for significant portions of their lives, and their potential for child bearing is 
something women in the industrialized world choose not to exercise throughout 
most of their lives. The gene's-eye view for maximum reproductive advantage 
explains next to nothing about the complexity and variation in women's lives and 
experiences: why women today continue to have fewer children, why they have 
them later in life, why in growing numbers they raise them independently of the 
biological father (whether from choice or force of circumstance), why a significant 
minority choose not to have children at all.  
 However, this does not mean that we can ignore women's reproductive 
biology. The female body's biological potential for impregnation can play a crucial 
role in the desires and fears which govern women's lives, at least some of the time. 
Moreover, not just cultural meanings, but also physiological events, are affected by 
cultural patterns, making reproductive cycles themselves culturally contingent. 
Thus, medical anthropologists Susan Sperling and Yewoubdar Beyene point out 
that there is no universal biological pattern for the female reproductive cycle. While 
Western women now experience approximately 35 years of ovulatory cycles; later 
menarche, early menopause and prolonged breast feeding, mean that in 
nonindustrial societies the menstrual cycles experienced by women are 
approximately only four years (Sperling and Beyene, p.145). Sperling and Beyene 
therefore emphasise the necessity of analysing the autonomous complexity of both 
biology and culture in reproductive studies, if we are to gain any clear 
understanding of how either biological plasticity, or cultural diversity, interact to 
produce reproductive experience. Rather than reinventing overarching laws to  
account for human behaviour, psychologists have everything to gain from attending 
to the critical conversations occurring both amongst and between cultural and 
biological theorists and researchers if they are ever to grapple with the constitutive 
roles of both culture and biology in the even greater complexities of the 
psychological domain. 
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